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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Appellant does not cite any additional constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations in this 
reply brief, and does not here rely upon any such items. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The State has conceded that Defendant Brent Ziegleman was 
illegally detained by Officer Bushnell. The search made by the 
officer during that illegal detention is constitutionally tainted; 
and the evidence found must be suppressed. 
1 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH MADE OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY TAINTED; AND ANY PURPORTED CONSENT TO 
SEARCH WAS INVALID• 
The State of Utah, in its brief, continues to contend that the 
initial stop of Defendant was valid, and that Defendant's 
constitutional rights were not violated by it. The State does, 
however, concede that the continued detention of Defendant and the 
change of the focus of that detention from speeding to car theft to 
drugs was a violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
Having conceded that fact, the State of Utah now asks this Court to 
completely ignore that illegal conduct and uphold the unlawful 
search that resulted from it. 
Before urging the Court to ignore its illegal conduct, the 
State first adds a couple of additional concessions. It concedes 
that, under the cases of State v. Sims, 808 P. 2d 141 (Utah App. 
1991)cert. pending, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (October 4, 1991) and 
State v. Park. 810 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1991) cert, denied. 827 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991) the consent to search relied upon by the State 
would be inadequate. The State then sidesteps or ignores the 
additional authority cited by Defendant in his original brief, and 
contends that a recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Thurman. 
203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) sweeps away all of Defendants 
supporting authority. This, of course, is simply not true. First 
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of all, it is significant that the Utah Supreme Court denied cert. 
on State v. Park, see 827 P.2d 327 (Utah, 1991). Secondly, it is 
even more significant that State v. Simsf is a companion case to 
the Utah Supreme Court case of Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
198 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah, 1992). In that case, already briefly 
referred to in Defendant's previous brief, the Utah Supreme Court 
suppressed evidence ceased at an illegal road block. That decision 
is clearly the law of the State of Utah; and nothing appears to 
have happened since that decision to overrule or weaken it. State 
v. Sims itself has been accepted for cert, see 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 
9 (Utah, 1991) and it seems highly likely that, based upon the 
companion case, the eventual decision will be a per curiam 
affirmance. The illegal detention of the Defendant in Sims is very 
much analogous to the illegal detention in the instant case. The 
Supreme Court, in reviewing that situation first determined that 
the roadblock where Mr. Sims was stopped was an illegal detention. 
In discussing the evidence obtained after that detention, the Court 
stated: 
Regarding the temporal proximity factor, Sims' consent 
was closely related in time to the initial stop. He 
consented during the unlawful detention with no 
intervening circumstances. The purpose of the roadblock 
was to obtain evidence of criminal violations, a purpose 
that does nothing to reduce the "f lagrancy" of the 
constitutional violation it precipitated. Trooper 
Howard's request for consent to search Sims' vehicle was 
based upon the smell of alcohol, the sight of an open 
liquor bottle, and Sims' admission that he was carrying 
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alcohol. Howard's opportunity to make these observations 
and to question Sims came about as a direct result of the 
illegal seizure. Sims did not spontaneously volunteer 
his consent, nor was he made aware of the fact that he 
could decline to consent. 
Given the totality of the circumstances in light of the 
relevant considerations, the voluntary consent in this 
case clearly was arrived at by exploitation of the 
unconstitutional roadblock. The consent did not, 
therefore, purge the evidence of the taint of illegality. 
198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-7. 
Nothing contained in the recent opinion cited by the State 
gives the indication that the Supreme Court has reversed itself on 
the fundamentals of the exclusionary rule in the last three months 
since the Sims decision was made. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the Thurman case, also did not 
suggest an overruling of its earlier case in State v. Arroyo. 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court put the 
burden clearly on the State to prove that there was a valid consent 
to a search by the Defendant. In doing so, the State must prove 
that the consent was not "obtained by police exploitation of the 
prior illegality." 796 P. 2d at 688. This is stiLl the test. That 
was confirmed, without a doubt, by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
Thurman case when the Court stated: 
In sum, to find that a defendant's consent following 
police illegality is valid under the Fourth Amendment, 
the prosecution must prove (i) that the defendant's 
consent was given voluntarily, i.e., that the consent was 
the product of his or her own free will; and (ii) that 
the consent was not obtained by exploitation of the prior 
illegality, i.e., that the connection between the consent 
4 
and the prior illegality was sufficiently attenuated that 
excluding the evidence would have no deterrent effect. 
203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. 
Nowhere in the State's brief does the State give any plausible 
argument for the fact that the consent to search obtained by 
Officer Bushnell was "sufficiently attenuated" from the illegal 
conduct of Officer Bushnell in holding Defendant for further 
investigation. In fact, the record is clear that everything that 
the officer did was directed toward one purpose: to find out why 
Defendant was acting "guilty" and to catch him doing something 
illegal. The officer was convinced, from the moment he pulled up 
along side Defendant's automobile, that Defendant was "guilty" and 
he made no apology for that decision in the suppression hearing. 
He made no apology for the fact that all of his conduct from that 
moment on was designed to catch the "guilty" person and to see that 
he was punished for his crime, whatever crime it might turn out to 
be. Defendant was stopped for that purpose, he was held for that 
purpose, he was questioned for that purpose, and a search was 
commenced for that purpose. 
The facts set forth in the Thurman case show some rather 
outrageous behavior on the part of the police officers involved in 
that search. Nevertheless, the court found that there was a 
substantial "attenuation" between that outrageous conduct and the 
consent to the search, which was obtained several hours later. The 
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Utah Supreme Court made that decision because the actual consent to 
search that was at issue was made in writing, was made after 
repeated "Miranda warnings" and was made well after the improper 
police conduct. Additionally, the consent made by Mr. Thurman was 
to the search of a storage unit which was completely separate from 
the scene where the original police misconduct had occurred. In 
fact, the police did not appear to have any knowledge of the 
existence of the storage unit to which they later obtained consent 
to search. Not only did Mr. Thurman consent to the search of the 
storage unit, it is apparently he who brought the existence of the 
storage unit to the attention of the police; and he did it after he 
was warned by the police that he did not have to answer any 
questions without an attorney present. 
None of those attenuating circumstances existed in the case of 
Mr. Ziegleman. Mr. Ziegleman was being held against his will while 
Officer Bushnell frantically searched for some evidence of some 
kind of crime. Unlike Mr. Thurman, no search warrant was issued at 
any time by any magistrate whatsoever; and that additional check on 
the raw power of the police did not exist. 
In attempting to glide over the lack of the attenuating 
circumstances required by both Arroyo and Thurman, the State has 
referred to the Supreme Court's discussion of policy arguments. In 
the Thurman case, there was a substantial discussion of the reason 
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reason behind the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases. The 
Court said: 
Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police from 
engaging in illegal conduct even though that conduct may 
be followed by a voluntary consent to the subsequent 
search. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. 
The Thurman court, however, went on to grade the misconduct of 
the police officer. In discussing its grading system, the court 
stated: 
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean 
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and 
the consent to find the consent valid. . . . The same 
type of break should be required where the evidence shows 
that the police purposely engaged in conduct to induce a 
consent. Conversely, where it appears that the 
illegality arose as the result of negligence, the lapse 
of time between the misconduct and the consent and the 
presence of intervening events become less critical to 
the dissipation of the taint. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. 
The State goes on to suggest that the illegality of the police 
officer's conduct is grounded exclusively on the decision of this 
Court in State v. Godina-Lunaf 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). The 
State therefore reasons that, because the conduct of the officer 
occurred prior to the decision of this Court in that case, the 
officer's conduct was a good faith attempt to follow the law. At 
worst, the State argues that the officer's illegal conduct was 
"arguably permissible" at the time, and that the officer was guilty 
of no more than negligence. Once again, this is simply not true. 
First of all, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make 
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the stop in the first place. The authority cited by Defendant in 
support of that proposition was well established in 1991 when the 
stop was made. 
Likewise, the authority cited by Defendant to challenge the 
continued detention and the investigation of the alleged illegal 
behavior, was not new at the time of the stop. In Utah the major 
authority for the proposition that the type of investigation 
undertaken by Officer Bushnell was not legal is the case of State 
v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431 (Utah App. 1990). The later case of 
State v. Godina-Luna is based extensively on the Robinson case; and 
the latter case does not break new ground. Officer Bushnell knew, 
or should have known, of the rules set forth by the Robinson court 
in dealing with the type of situation that he confronted in this 
matter. He could not have had a good faith belief that his wild 
search for something to explain the "guilty" behavior of Defendant 
was justified. The later decisions by this court that have 
continued to strike down this kind of police behavior should have 
come as no surprise to Officer Bushnell nor to the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah. The officer's behavior at the time of the 
stop, the detention and the search was all one tightly connected 
stream of behavior. There is no way that the Thurman case can be 
used by the officer to wriggle out of what he should have known at 
the time he stopped Defendant: that he could not stop or detain a 
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Defendant without articulable suspicion of particular criminal 
behavior• The Supreme Court continues to require a clean break 
between the illegal behavior and a search that comes out of it. 
There is no such break; and any consent given by Defendant to the 
search made by Officer Bushnell is hopelessly tainted. 
The Supreme Court also clarified the standard of review of a 
determination as to whether the consent was voluntary and was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal conduct of the officer. 
That standard is that this is a question of law, and is to be 
reviewed for correctness (203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26). The decision 
of the trial court was obviously not correct. It was made on the 
false assumption (conceded by the State) that the officer's conduct 
in detaining Defendant was lawful. Without this assumption, the 
Court's finding and conclusion cannot stand and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence obtained by Officer Bushnell in this matter was 
illegally obtained from Defendant; and the use of the evidence 
should be suppressed. Therefore, the ruling of the court below 
denying the suppression should be reversed. 
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DATED this / J day of February, 1993. 
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